In 1936, the Supreme Court overturned a 1934 Louisiana law which levied a tax on newspapers in that state. In its decision the court provided a lengthy account of "taxes on knowledge" in both British and American history. In its concluding remarks just before the decision, the Court said:

"The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information. The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." [Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936), page 250 - emphasis added]

211 US 78 (1908) Twining v. State of New Jersey

268 US 652 (1925) Gitlow v. State of New York

297 US 244 (1936) Grosjean v. American Press Co.

299 US 364 (1937)De Jonge v. Oregon

303 US 450 ( ) Lovell v. City of Griffen

308 US 147 (1939) Schneider v. New Jersey

" . . . it must not be forgotten that in a free representative government nothing is more fundamental than the right of the people, through their appointed servants, to govern themselves in accordance with their own will, except so far as they have restrained themselves by constitutional limits specifically established, and that, in our peculiar dual form of government, nothing is more fundamental than the full power of the state to order its own affairs and govern its own people, except so far as the Federal Constitution, expressly or by fair implication, has withdrawn that power." [211 US 78, p 106]

". . . . we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press -- which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard the incidental ... [268 US 652 (1925) Gitlow v. State of New York - emphasis added]

This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. [See footnote 9] The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties. [308 US 147, page 161 -emphasis added]

"That freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by state legislation, has likewise been settled by a series of decisions of this court beginning with Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 , 45 S.Ct. 625, and ending with Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 , 51 S.Ct. 625. The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well. Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 , 17 S. Ct. 427."

Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, 268 U.S. 652, at page 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629; Stromberg v. California, supra, 283 U.S. 359, at page 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707, 51 S.Ct. 625, 627; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 244 S., 56 S.Ct. 444, 446.

The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552: 'The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.' The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions-principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 47 S.Ct. 103, 48 A.L.R. 1102; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63, 84 A.L.R. 527; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra. [299 US 364 - emphasis added]

These rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people through their Legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the

abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. [299 U.S. 353, De Jonge v. Oregon, (1937) pages 364 to 365]