395 U.S. 367 (1969) Red Lion v. FCC
The Supreme Court: Censorship of the news by the state or by private interests is a violation of the Constitution. The right of the American people and the right of the American electorate to be informed is paramount and is, in fact, essential to self-government.
395 U.S. 367 (1969) Red Lion v. FCC
1. In 1969, the Court upheld a DC Court of Appeals decision upholding the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine, and reversed a 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decision which held the "Fairness Doctrine as abridging the freedoms of speech and press. In point 1 of the summary of the opinion, the Supreme Court found that the FCC did not exceed its authority and that in fact with the adoption of new regulations on personal attacks and political editorials was implementing congressional policy. In point 2 of the summary, the "Fairness Doctrine" was found not to have violated the First Amendment, and in fact the Court declared that the First Amendment rights of the public were superior to the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters, and further declared that private censorship by broadcasters was not protected by the First Amendment. See 2(a) and 2(b) below:
[395 U.S. 367] "2. The fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political editorial rules do not violate the First Amendment. Pp. 386-401.
(a) The First Amendment is relevant to public broadcasting, but it is the right of the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. Pp. 386-390.
" The First Amendment is relevant to public broadcasting, but it is the right of the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
(b) The First Amendment does not protect private censorship by broadcasters who are licensed by the Government to use a scarce resource which is denied to others. Pp. 390-392."
"The First Amendment does not protect private censorship by broadcasters who are licensed by the Government to use a scarce resource which is denied to others."
2. In the opinion itself, the Court cited two Supreme Court decisions of 1940 and 1955 [see below] as to reaffirming the paramount rights of the viewing and listening public as being consistent with the "ends and purposes of the First Amendment." The opinion continues saying that the purpose of the First Amendment is "to preserve an uninhibited market-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail," and thus prevent monopolization of that market-place of ideas by the government or by a private interest.
[395 U.S. 389-390] "This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in [section] 326 [of the Communications Act of 1934] , which forbids FCC interference with "the right of free speech by means of radio communication." Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361 -362 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947)."
[395 U.S. 390] "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 -75 (1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC."
" ' It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.' Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)"
3. The edict against the private censorship of ideas is again strongly reaffirmed in the following paragraph, citing a Supreme Court decision of 1945.
[395 U.S. 392] Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing controversial issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to communicate with the public. Otherwise, station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all. "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
"There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all. 'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.' " (395 U.S. 367 (1969) Red Lion v. FCC)